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Abstract 
 
Previous research has shown that people’s judgments about who owns an object depend on the 
amount and type of labor involved in acquiring it. While informative about the influence of labor 
on the acquisition of existing objects, little is known about how ownership judgments are made 
for objects that are created out of non-owned materials.  The current studies investigated whether 
people judge that creation confers ownership, and how an agent’s intent influences people’s 
ownership judgments. Experiment 1 revealed that people view creation as conferring ownership, 
but that ownership is not established when an agent’s attempt to create fails. Experiment 2 
revealed that creators own objects that they create intentionally, but not objects that they create 
without intent. Experiment 3 revealed that people consider true creation to be the result of 
intentional actions, and that those responsible for true creation are granted ownership at higher 
rates than those viewed as only having modified an existing object. The similar pattern of 
responses in previous research about labor involving acquiring objects and the current research 
on labor involving creating objects suggests that a general notion of labor could underlie 
people’s ownership judgments.   
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We live in a world of human-made creations, from the shoes on our feet to the Great Wall 
of China. Without these creations we would sip water from cupped hands, eat with our fingers, 
walk barefoot, and we would never experience the beauty of art. The importance of human-made 
creations is exemplified by their ubiquity in all forms of human society.  
Creators have a privileged status in relation to their creations.  First, an object’s physical 
characteristics are determined by its creator. Second, the creator of an object determines what 
kind of thing it is (Bloom, 1996; Gelman & Bloom, 2000). Even two-year-olds acknowledge 
this. For example, they decide whether a drawing depicts a balloon or a lollipop, by considering 
what the creator of the drawing intended the drawing to depict (Bloom & Markson, 1998).  
Third, the creator of an object also establishes its function (Rips, 1989; Matan & Carey, 2001; 
Kelemen & Carey, 2007; but see Malt & Johnson, 1992). When deciding the function of an 
object, like adults, even six-year-olds privilege the function intended by the object’s creator (e.g., 
a pot used for making tea) over factors such as the function for which the object is currently used 
(e.g., watering flowers; Matan & Carey, 2001). 
A further outcome of creation may be ownership; the creator of an object may view 
herself as its owner. Others may heed her entitlement to ownership as well. A woman who carves 
a block of wood into a cup may come to own the cup. Likewise, a man who chisels a rock into an 
arrowhead may come to own that arrowhead. The idea that creation establishes ownership is 
consistent with accounts holding that mixing one’s labor with materials confers ownership over 
them (Locke, 1690/1978) because creation requires labouring on materials.  
Previous research suggests that laypeople’s judgments about ownership are broadly 
consistent with the labor theory (Friedman, 2010; Palamar, Le, & Friedman, 2012).  For 
example, participants judged that a precious gem jutting out of a cliff does not necessarily belong 
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to the first person to spot it, nor to the first person to physically possess it, but rather to the first 
one who succeeds in dislodging it (Friedman, 2010). This suggests that labor alone is not 
sufficient to establish ownership; rather, one must labor successfully to become an owner. As 
such, creating an object might be an exemplary case of labor because creation typically provides 
evidence for successful labor.  
Nonetheless, for several reasons, it is uncertain whether people judge that creation 
confers ownership. First, before creating an object, people typically possess the materials used to 
create it. Before creating the cup, the woman will need to possess the wood, just as the man 
creating the arrowhead will need to possess the rock. So perhaps they own their creations 
because they already own the materials out of which they are formed. On this view, creation 
cannot confer ownership if creation is preceded by ownership. This critique of the creation 
account has been applied to labor accounts of ownership acquisition more broadly (e.g., 
Waldron, 1988, pp. 173-174).  
Second, although some studies suggest that labor confers ownership, these studies 
examined situations where agents labored to make an inaccessible object available, such as the 
rare gem described above (Friedman, 2010), or a feather stuck in a cactus (Palamar et al., 2012). 
But it is uncertain whether people approach ownership with a general theory of labor, which they 
apply both to cases of making inaccessible objects available and to cases of creation. Hence, 
these studies are uninformative about whether people view creation as conferring ownership, and 
so it remains unknown whether people view other forms of labor (e.g., labor involved in 
creation) as conferring ownership.   
A third reason for uncertainty is that evidence of creation’s influence on ownership 
judgments is both mixed and limited. Some studies have examined the effects of creation on 
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ownership judgments in the context of transfers of ownership. In one study, participants were 
told a story of a man who borrowed a piece of wood belonging to someone else, and carved it 
into a statue worth $100 (Hook, 1993). Participants judged that the original owner still owned the 
wood even after it was turned into a statue.  Laboring on someone else’s object was deemed 
insufficient for transferring ownership of the object1.  
In another study, children and adults swapped clay animals with an experimenter, and 
either remodelled each other’s clay into a different shape, cut a small piece with a plastic knife, 
or simply held it for a brief period of time (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010). Although 3- 
and 4-year-olds claimed that the clay animals now belonged to the people who remodelled them, 
most adults claimed that they still belonged to the original owners. 	  Hence adults do not judge 
that creating an object causes ownership to be transferred away from the original owner to the 
creator. However, it should be noted that the study of ownership transfer differs from the goal of 
the present studies. In examples involving ownership transfer, the objects are already owned, 
whereas the present studies deal with acquiring ownership over objects that did not even exist 
prior to being created. 
Only one study has examined whether creation establishes ownership over non-owned 
objects (Beggan & Brown, 1994). Participants read a story about a boy who either simply played 
with a tree branch or carved it into the shape of an airplane.  He then left the branch where he 
found it, and returned later to find it in someone else’s possession. When told that the boy carved 
the branch into an airplane, participants were more inclined to grant him ownership than when 
told he simply played with it. However, these ownership judgments did not favor the boy at rates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1However, when asked how to divide the profit if the statue was sold, participants allocated just over half of the 
earnings to the one who carved it. Despite rewarding his labor with a share of the profit, the borrower was not 
granted ownership of the statue. 
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exceeding chance. Thus, no known studies have demonstrated whether creation establishes 
ownership over non-owned objects. 
The Place of Intent in Ownership 
If creation does confer ownership, we might reasonably expect knowledge of the 
creator’s intent to influence ownership judgments. One reason to expect this is that intent 
impacts ownership judgments in cases where agents labored to make an inaccessible object 
available. For example, participants were more likely to grant ownership to an agent who made 
an object available (e.g., by knocking a pineapple out of a tree) when the agent intended this 
outcome than when this outcome was an unintended consequence (Palamar et al., 2012). Given 
that intent matters in cases involving laboring for possession, it may also matter in cases 
involving laboring for creation. Because little is known about the relation between how people 
view these two kinds of labor, understanding the influence of intent should shed light on the 
commonalities or differences between the two. 
 Another reason to expect that intent will influence ownership judgments is that objects 
that are made unintentionally may not be viewed as creations at all (Bloom, 1996; Bloom & 
Markson, 1998; Gelman & Ebeling, 1998; Diesdendruck, Markson, & Bloom, 2003).  For 
example, when told that a painting was made intentionally, children labelled the items depicted 
in it (e.g., by calling the painting ‘a bear’). However, when shown a painting said to be created 
by accident, children would often refer to the literal contents (e.g., by calling it “paint”). Adults 
show the same tendency (Gelman & Ebeling, 1998). These findings suggest that people are less 
likely to view the modification of objects (e.g., by spilling paint on a canvas) as an act of 
creation if intent is missing. As such, people may not grant ownership to a creator when she acts 
without intent.  
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The current studies explore whether laboring to create objects leads to similar ownership 
judgments as found in previous work investigating laboring to acquire objects. Beyond asking if 
creation leads to ownership, we also wish to determine under what conditions this occurs. Three 
experiments were conducted to explore the factors that influence laypeople’s ownership 
judgments for created objects. Vignettes were presented to participants that involved two 
characters arguing over an object.  In each vignette, one character either succeeded or failed to 
create an object, and a different character (the “first possessor”) physically claimed the object 
before the creator. Experiments 1A and 1B revealed that ownership is granted to an individual 
who succeeds in creating an object, but not when the individual fails. Experiment 2A and 2B 
revealed that ownership is more likely to be granted to a creator who acts intentionally. Finally, 
Experiments 3A and 3B demonstrated that ownership judgments are influenced by how a 
creator’s actions are perceived: Participants side more with an agent who is seen as creating an 
object than one who is seen as modifying an object. These findings suggest that true creation is 
judged to confer ownership, but that acting with intent is a necessary component of true creation. 
The influence of intent on ownership judgments suggests that people may have a general notion 
of labor that applies not only to object acquisition, but to object creation as well. 
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Experiment 1A 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-two participants (18 males, aged 18-65 years, mean = 35 years, 
standard deviation = 11 years) were recruited and tested using online testing software 
(Crowdflower and Qualtrics). Participants located throughout the United States were paid $0.25 
for completing the task, which took approximately 2-3 minutes.  To ensure that the study was 
only taken once per participant, restrictions were placed that prevented identical Worker IDs 
and/or IP addresses from participating. This restriction not only prevented individuals from 
participating in the same study more than once, but also disqualified them from all subsequent 
experiments.  An additional 22 participants were excluded from the final analysis for failing 
comprehension questions.  These questions were designed to ensure that participants were 
reading the passage carefully; this same process of data removal was applied in all subsequent 
experiments.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were assigned to read one of two stories 
presented on their computers. On a screen preceding the story, participants were instructed to 
read the story carefully and to respond to the questions that follow. Participants clicked a button 
to access each new screen, meaning that each participant determined the pace of the study. Each 
story appeared on a screen along with the key question, “Who does the [object] belong to?” with 
both characters’ names immediately below. After choosing who the object belongs to, 
participants proceeded to a new screen, where they were asked to indicate their level of 
confidence in their response, with options ranging from 1 (not confident at all) to 5 (very 
confident). Then, on a new screen following the confidence scale, participants received 4 
comprehension questions (see Appendix). The order of questions remained fixed in all 
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conditions (however, the order of response options was counterbalanced). Participants were 
unable to revert to previous screens once a new screen was accessed. 
Both stories described a man named Mike, who was at a landfill trying to create a novelty 
ashtray by crushing a metal can. Mike succeeded in creating the ashtray in one story, but failed 
in the other.  After Mike’s attempt to create the ashtray (whether successful or not), another man 
named Dave picked it up before Mike was able to. Participants were randomly assigned to read 
either the Successful Creation or the Failed Creation story. Text that differed between the two 
versions is in brackets.  
People sometimes visit a local landfill looking for things that can be salvaged and sold. 
Mike is on a large hill at the landfill. He sees a big metal can 20 feet away. Mike decides 
to crush it into an ashtray. However, crushing the can just right won’t be easy. He picks 
up a heavy rock, walks a little bit closer, and throws it at the can. The rock [crushes the 
can into an ashtray/completely misses the can]! 
Mike walks towards the [ashtray/can]. Before he reaches it, a gust of wind sends it rolling 
down the hill. Mike walks down to get it. When he gets to the bottom, he sees that 
another man named Dave has picked it up. The two argue about who gets to keep the 
[ashtray/can]. 
Results and Discussion 
If participants view creation as leading to ownership, they should strongly support the 
Creator when his attempt to create succeeds, but not when it fails. If participants do not view 
creation as leading to ownership, they should side with the Creator at similar rates in both 
conditions.  
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To test these predictions, we combined the two measures used to assess ownership 
judgments (i.e., character choice and confidence rating).  We subtracted 0.5 from each 
confidence rating, and then multiplied the value by +1 for choices favoring the Creator and by -1 
for choices favoring the First Possessor. Subtracting 0.5 from the rating score generated a more 
sensitive continuous measure to analyze ownership judgments than if this calculation was not 
performed. For example, if one participant favored Dave and had a confidence score of 1, and 
another participant favored Mike with the same degree of confidence, their two judgment scores 
would be -1 and +1 respectively, prior to subtracting 0.5 from each. This would result in a 
difference of 2 points. However, subtracting 0.5 from each score would result in -0.5 and +0.5, 
which is only a difference of 1 point. This scoring procedure yielded a response scale ranging 
from -4.5 (maximum support for first possessor) to +4.5 (maximum support for the Creator). The 
scoring method was based on Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, and Hastie (2007), and was used in 
all subsequent experiments.  
Results are depicted in the left half of Figure 1. Participants were more likely to attribute 
ownership to the Creator when his attempt to create was successful (78% of responses, M = 1.98, 
SD = 2.98) as compared to when his attempt failed (36% of responses, M = -1.02, SD = 3.14), 
t(50) = 3.54, p = .001. When creation succeeded, participants sided with the Creator; their scores 
exceeded the chance score of 0, one-sample t-test, t(26) = 3.46, p = .002. In contrast, when 
creation failed, support for the Creator decreased. In fact, judgments appeared to lean away from 
the creator, one-sample t-test, t(24) = 1.63, p = .12. These findings suggest that ownership is 
granted to successful creators, but not to those who fail to create.  
However, in this experiment, success was conflated with physical contact. When the 
Creator succeeded, his rock also made contact with the can; however, when the Creator failed to 
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create, his rock never made contact. So rather than supporting successful creation, participants’ 
responses may have been driven by the creator’s physical contact with the object. The next 
experiment was conducted to rule out this possibility. In the following experiment, participants 
read stories where the creator’s rock always made contact with the object regardless of whether 
creation succeeded or failed.  
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Experiment 1B 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-three participants (31 males, aged 19-61 years, mean = 33 years, 
standard deviation = 11 years) were recruited using Crowdflower. An additional 23 participants 
were excluded from the final analysis for failing comprehension questions.   
Materials and Procedure. The study design was similar to Experiment 1A, except now 
physical contact with the object of interest was achieved in both stories. In the successful 
creation story, Mike crushed the can into an ashtray, just as he planned.  In the failed creation 
story, Mike dented the can, but did not create the ashtray as he planned. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions. As in Experiment 1A, each version of the story 
ended with the key question, “Who does the [object] belong to?” The structure of the survey (i.e., 
confidence rating, comprehension questions) remained the same as in the previous experiment. 
Text that differs between the two versions is in brackets. 
People sometimes visit a local landfill looking for things that can be salvaged and sold. 
Mike is on a large hill at the landfill. He sees a big metal can 20 feet away. Mike decides 
to crush it into an ashtray. However, crushing the can just right won’t be easy. He picks 
up a heavy rock, walks a little bit closer, and throws it at the can. The rock [crushes the 
can into an ashtray/dents the can, but does not crush it]!  
Mike walks towards the [ashtray/dented can]. Before he reaches it, another man named 
Dave runs over and picks it up. The two argue about who gets to keep the [ashtray/dented 
can]. 
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Results and Discussion 
If creation is necessary to bestow ownership, then participants should be more likely to 
side with the Creator when creation is successful than when contact is made but creation is 
unsuccessful.  However, if contact suffices to bestow ownership, then participants should select 
the Creator at equal rates across conditions. Using the same scoring procedure as the previous 
experiment, scores for the creation and contact-only conditions were compared.  
Results are depicted in the right half of Figure 1. When creation was successful, 
participants were more inclined to attribute ownership to the Creator (78% of responses, M = 
2.16, SD = 2.87) compared to when contact was made but creation was unsuccessful (45% of 
responses, M = -0.11, SD = 3.49), t(58) = 2.81, p = .007 (corrected for violating Levene’s test for 
equality of variance). The Creator was selected at rates above chance when creation was 
successful, one sample t-test, t(31) = 4.23, p < .001, but not in the story where creation failed, 
one sample t-test, t(30) = -0.18, p = .86. These findings suggest that successful creation bestows 
ownership to the Creator, but contact alone (without creation) is insufficient to establish 
ownership.  
The findings so far suggest that creation does in fact confer ownership. The next 
experiments examined whether intent has an influence on ownership judgments as well.  
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Figure 1. Experiment 1. Mean ownership rating scores calculated by multiplying character 
selection (-1 for first possessor, +1 for Creator) by confidence rating, and subtracting 0.5. Scores 
range from -4.5 (full support for first possessor) to +4.5 (full support for Creator). Error bars 
represent one standard error of their respective means. 
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Experiment 2A 
 The above studies show that people judge creation confers ownership. In previous 
research involving cases of laboring to acquire objects, intent had an impact on ownership 
judgments. That is, a person who makes an inaccessible object available is only judged to own it 
if her actions were intentional. Because creation is also a form of labor, it is possible that it is 
influenced by intent as well. The current study seeks to determine if intent influences ownership 
judgments for created objects. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-six participants (37 males, aged 17-63 years, mean = 30 years, 
standard deviation = 10 years) were recruited using Crowdflower. An additional 24 participants 
were excluded from the final analysis for failing comprehension questions.   
Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to read either a story in 
which Mike throws paint at a wooden board because he wants to make a painting (i.e., Mike acts 
with intent), or a story in which he throws paint just for fun (i.e., Mike acts without intent). In 
contrast to the previous studies, Mike succeeds in his actions in both scenarios.  Each version of 
the story ended with the key question, “Who does the [object] belong to?” The remainder of the 
survey followed the same structure as the previous experiments. Text that differs between the 
two conditions is in brackets. 
People sometimes visit a local landfill looking for things that can be salvaged and 
sold. Mike is on a large hill at the landfill. He sees a wooden board. Mike picks up 
a half empty paint can and throws it at the board [to make a splatter painting/ just 
for the fun of it]. The paint splatters all over the board. The [painting/painted 
board] looks surprisingly good. Suddenly, a gust of wind causes the 
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[painting/painted board] to roll down the hill. Mike wants the [painting/painted 
board].  
Another man named Dave is walking at the bottom of the hill. He sees the 
[painting/painted board] on the ground and picks it up. When Mike reaches the 
bottom of the hill, they begin to argue about who gets to keep it. 
Results and Discussion 
If intent is necessary for creation to confer ownership, participants should be more likely 
to side with Creator when he intends to create than when he lacks intention.  Results are depicted 
on the left side of Figure 2. Participants granted ownership more when the Creator acted 
intentionally (91% of responses, M = 3.04, SD = 2.11) than when he acted without intent (65% of 
responses, M = 1.44, SD = 3.51), t(47.9) = 2.22, p = .03 (corrected for violating Levene’s test). 
Although support for the Creator differed across conditions, participants in both the intent and 
no-intent conditions granted ownership to the Creator at rates above chance, t(34) = 8.55, p < 
.001, and t(30) = 2.28, p = .03, respectively. These findings suggest that creation bestows 
ownership, but that intention dramatically increases support for the Creator. 
This study demonstrated the influence of intent in ownership judgments for created items. 
However, a potential variable that may have affected decisions in this and previous experiments 
could be how the object was labelled. For example, when Mike successfully crushed the can in 
Experiment 1B, participants were asked to determine who the ashtray belonged to; when he 
failed, participants were asked to indicate who the dented can belonged to. Likewise, depending 
on the condition in the current experiment, participants were either asked who the “painting” 
belonged to, or who the “painted board” belonged to.  Perhaps there is an implicit assumption 
that a “painted board” is qualitatively different from a “painting” with respect to its value or 
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scarcity. This potential difference could account for participants siding with the Creator at 
different rates across conditions. The next experiment sought to address this alternative 
possibility.  
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Experiment 2B 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and twenty-nine participants (48 males, aged 17-65 years, 
mean= 37 years, standard deviation= 11 years) were recruited using Crowdflower. An additional 
30 participants were excluded from the final analysis for failing comprehension questions.   
Materials and procedure. As in the previous study, participants read stories in which an 
agent’s action caused a board to be painted, either because the agent intended the board to be a 
painting, or without this intention. In the previous experiment, this comparison was confounded 
with an identity and label change—in the intent condition, the painted board was referred to as a 
painting whereas in the no-intent condition it was simply referred to as a painted board. Hence, 
in the current study we added a third condition, in which the object was intentionally changed, 
but retained its original description (i.e., the board was intentionally painted, but was referred to 
as a “painted board” instead of as a “painting”). If intent is an important factor in ownership 
judgments, then we should not expect ratings to differ between the two intent stories, despite the 
use of different object labels.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: intent-to-create (painting label), 
no intent-to-create (painted board label), and intent-to-modify (also painted board label). Each 
story ended with the key question, “Who does the [object] belong to?” The remainder of the 
survey followed the same structure as the previous experiments. Text that differed between the 
three versions is in brackets. 
People sometimes visit a local landfill looking for things that can be salvaged and 
sold. Mike is on a large hill at the landfill. He sees an ugly wooden board. Mike 
picks up a half empty paint can and throws it at the board [to make a splatter 
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painting/just for the fun of it/to make a painted board]. The paint splatters all over 
the board. The [painting/painted board] looks surprisingly good. Suddenly, a gust 
of wind causes the [painting/painted board] to roll down the hill. Mike wants the 
[painting/painted board].  
Another man named Dave is walking at the bottom of the hill. He sees the 
[painting/painted board] on the ground and picks it up. When Mike reaches the 
bottom of the hill, they begin to argue about who gets to keep it. 
Results and Discussion 
 If intent matters for creation to bestow ownership, participants should be more likely to 
side with the Creator when he acted intentionally. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed an overall effect of condition, F(2, 126) = 4.88, MSE = 9.10, p = .009. As shown on the 
right side of Figure 2, when creation was unintentional, fewer participants (61% of responses, M 
= .93, SD = 3.68) sided with the Creator than when he intentionally created either a painting 
(86% of responses, M = 2.88, SD = 2.25) or a painted board (79% of responses, M = 2.38, SD = 
2.92), t(81.6) = 2.04, p = .044, and t(71.8) = 2.98, p = .004, respectively (corrected for violating 
Levene’s test). Importantly, there was no significant difference in response rates between the 
intent-to-create and intent-to-modify conditions, t(83) =.88, p = .38.  That is, whether the created 
object was referred to as a painting or simply a painted board did not influence response rates. 
This suggests that the difference between intentional and unintentional creation does not depend 
on differences in how the end product is labelled.  These findings address the concern that 
providing a novel name to the end product (i.e., painting) implies greater value than referring to 
it as a modification of the original item (i.e., painted board). 
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Figure 2.	  Experiment 2. Mean ownership rating scores calculated by multiplying character 
selection by confidence rating, and subtracting 0.5. Scores range from -4.5 (full support for first 
possessor) to +4.5 (full support for Creator). Error bars represent one standard error of their 
respective means.  
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Experiment 3A 
In the previous experiments, the test scenarios stipulated that the creator’s efforts led to 
the creation of a new object. However, it is possible that some participants might not have 
accepted this. For example, they might have rejected the claim that crushing a can really makes 
an ashtray. In this view, ownership judgments may simply be influenced by acts of labor rather 
than by acts of creation per se. The current study explicitly asked participants to indicate how 
they perceived the end product.  That is, do participants infer that the original product has merely 
been altered, or do they infer that a new product has been created? This study implemented a 
new setting (i.e., a forest as opposed to a landfill) and a novel, fictitious object (a “torgo shell”). 
These changes allowed us to explore if the influence of intent extends beyond the context of our 
previous studies.  
Method 
Participants. Eighty-six participants (40 males, aged 17-61 years, mean = 33 years, 
standard deviation = 11 years) were recruited using Crowdflower. An additional 23 participants 
were excluded from the final analysis for failing comprehension questions.   
Materials and Procedure. The current study used stories in which a “torgo shell” was 
turned into a useful bowl after having a hole punched in it. In the intent condition, the agent 
(Mike) intentionally turned the shell into a bowl.  In the no intent condition, the shell was also 
turned into a bowl, but unintentionally. For this experiment, rather than making an ownership 
judgment, participants were asked to indicate whether Mike truly created a bowl, or actually just 
modified a torgo shell by breaking it. This question was designed to test whether, despite using 
the same label to describe the end product in both conditions, participants perceived Mike’s 
actions as leading to a different end result. Participants were assigned to read either the intent or 
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no intent condition. The new key question appeared immediately below each passage: “Below 
are two statements. Which one best describes what Mike did in the story?” Participants were 
offered the response options “Mike put a hole in a shell” and “Mike created a bowl.” The order 
of these response choices was randomized. The rest of the survey was structured like the 
previous experiments (i.e., confidence rating followed by comprehension questions). Text that 
differed between the two versions is in brackets. 
Deep in a forest, Mike [sees a torgo shell on the ground. Punching a hole into the 
shell will make it into a useful bowl. Mike wants to do this by knocking down a 
tree branch, so that it falls onto the torgo shell/spots a decaying tree branch. Mike 
wants to knock down the tree branch by throwing a rock at it]. Mike picks up a 
rock and throws it. The rock smashes into the tree branch, causing the branch to 
fall. 
The tree branch hits the torgo shell, punching a large hole into it. The torgo shell 
is now a perfect bowl. But suddenly a gust of wind causes the bowl to roll away. 
Mike wants the bowl. 
Another man named Dave is walking on a path in the forest. He sees the bowl by 
the side of the path and picks it up. Mike hurries over, and the two argue about 
who gets to keep it. 
Results and Discussion 
If intention is a necessary component of true creation, participants in the intent condition 
should be more likely to agree that “Mike created a bowl.”  In contrast, participants in the no-
intent condition should think that Mike modified an existing object, but did not create something 
new. Alternatively, if simply labelling the end product with a novel name implies true creation, 
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intent should not influence participant responses across conditions. The same scoring method 
was applied as in previous experiments (choice multiplied by confidence), however this time 
responses favoring modification (i.e., shell with hole) were scored as -1, and responses favoring 
creation (i.e., bowl) were scored as +1. Participants endorsed creation at higher rates in the intent 
condition (76% of responses, M = 2.07, SD = 3.31) than in the no-intent condition (45% of 
responses, M = -.43, SD = 3.87), t(77.3) = 3.18, p = .002 (corrected for violating Levene’s test). 
These findings suggest that true creation depends on the intent of the creator.  Even though both 
stories explicitly referred to the end product as a created object, when intent was lacking, 
participants were less likely to endorse true creation than when intent was specified.  
This study demonstrated how intent influences whether actions are perceived as leading 
to true creation or only to modification of an object.  Although this study suggests that intent is 
necessary for true creation, participants were not asked to provide an ownership judgment.  The 
next study addressed the relation between how the Creator’s actions are perceived and how 
perception of his actions influenced ownership judgments.  
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Experiment 3B 
The goal of the current study was to examine whether the same participants who view the 
Creator’s actions as leading to true creation are also those who grant him ownership. In this 
study, participants were asked to provide an ownership judgment and to indicate whether they 
perceived the Creator’s actions as leading to true creation or only to modification.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred and twenty-eight participants (50 males, aged 17-64 years, 
mean = 36 years, standard deviation = 12 years) were recruited using Crowdflower. An 
additional 50 participants were excluded from the final analysis for failing comprehension 
questions.   
Materials and procedure. The study design was similar to that of the previous 
experiment, but now all participants read a story in which an object was unintentionally created. 
Based on the previous experiments, an unintentional-creation scenario should lead to the highest 
variation in participant responses with respect to ownership judgments and how the Creator’s 
action is perceived. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two cover stories. In the 
“painting” cover story, Mike threw a can of paint at a wooden board just for fun, and ended up 
creating a painting. In the “bowl” cover story, Mike threw a rock at a tree branch and ended up 
turning a torgo shell into a bowl by puncturing it. After reading one of the cover stories, each 
participant received two key questions. The first question was about ownership, and appeared 
immediately below each passage, followed by a confidence rating on a new screen. Next, 
participants received the interpretation question (from the previous experiment) on a new screen, 
also followed by a confidence rating.  
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Bowl story. Deep in a forest, Mike spots a decaying tree branch. Mike wants to 
knock down the tree branch by throwing a rock at it. Mike picks up a rock and 
throws it. The rock smashes into the tree branch, causing the branch to fall. 
The tree branch hits a torgo shell, punching a large hole into it. The torgo shell is 
now a perfect bowl. But suddenly a gust of wind causes the bowl to roll away. 
Mike wants the bowl. 
Another man named Dave is walking on a path in the forest. He sees the bowl by 
the side of the path and picks it up. Mike hurries over, and the two argue about 
who gets to keep it. 
Painting story. People sometimes visit a local landfill looking for things that can 
be salvaged and sold. Mike is on a large hill at the landfill. He sees an ugly 
wooden board. Mike picks up a half empty paint can and throws it at the board 
just for the fun of it.  
The paint splatters all over the board. The painted board is now a surprisingly 
good painting. Suddenly, a gust of wind causes the painting to roll down the hill. 
Mike wants the painting.  
Another man named Dave is walking at the bottom of the hill. He sees the 
painting on the ground and picks it up. When Mike reaches the bottom of the hill, 
they begin to argue about who gets to keep it. 
Results and Discussion 
If creation influences judgments about ownership, then participants who interpret the 
story as a true creation event should be more likely to side with the Creator than should those 
who do not. Put differently, we may expect that those who do not side with the Creator are also 
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less inclined to view the agent’s actions as leading to true creation.  Using the same scoring 
procedure as in previous experiments, we obtained two scores for each participant. This allowed 
us to examine both the ownership score, ranging from -4.5 (first possessor, Dave) to +4.5 
(Creator, Mike), and the creation score, ranging from -4.5 (no creation, or modification-only) to 
+4.5 (true creation).  For each story, ownership judgments were compared for those who chose 
modification-only (creation score < 0) and those who chose true creation (creation score > 0). 
For each of these groups, ownership judgment scores were also compared against chance using a 
one-sample t-test.  Results are depicted in Figure 3. 
Bowl story. For participants who judged that the object was merely modified (62% of 
participants, M = -3.39, SD = .86), ownership judgments favored each character equally, M = .16, 
SD = 3.44, one-sample t-test, t(37) = .28, p = .78. However, for participants who judged that the 
object was a true creation (38% of participants, M = 3.33, SD = .83), most granted ownership to 
the Creator (70% of responses, M = 1.63, SD = 3.61), one-sample t-test, t(22) = 2.17, p = .04. An 
independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference between ownership judgments for 
participants who chose modification and those who chose true creation, t(59) = -1.59, p = .122. 
Painting story. The same general pattern was observed in the painting story.  However, 
regardless of whether participants judged the object as being merely modified or being a true 
creation, both groups sided with the Creator at rates above chance.  Participants who judged that 
the object was merely modified (81% of participants, M = -3.70, SD = 1.00) sided with the 
Creator over the First Possessor (67% of responses, M = 1.35, SD = 3.39), t(53) = 2.93, p = .005. 
Of the 19% of participants who judged that the object was a true creation, 92% favored the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  However,	  a	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  Test	  revealed	  	  that	  participants	  who	  interpreted	  the	  Creator’s	  actions	  as	  true	  
creation	  were	  in	  fact	  more	  likely	  to	  grant	  him	  ownership	  than	  those	  who	  viewed	  his	  actions	  as	  only	  modification,	  
U=	  294,	  p	  =.03.	  This	  analysis	  was	  performed	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐normal	  distributions	  of	  participants’	  ownership	  and	  
interpretation	  judgments.	  The	  same	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  respondents	  in	  the	  painting	  
condition,	  U	  =	  192.5,	  p	  =.01.	  
	   25	  
Creator over the First Possessor, M = 3.42, SD = 2.47, t(12) = 5.01, p < .001. Although 
participants who judged the event as mere modification and those who judged the event as true 
creation both exceeded chance in their ownership judgments, the effect size was much larger in 
the latter (Cohen’s d = 1.39) than the former (Cohen’s d = 0.40), suggesting that creation has a 
bigger influence on ownership judgments than modification. Finally, an independent samples t-
test revealed that participants who chose modification favored the creator at rates higher than 
those who chose true creation, t(24.3) = -2.51, p = .02 (corrected for violating Levene’s test). 
In both stories, participants favored the Creator more when they interpreted his actions as 
leading to true creation. Put differently, participants showed greater support for the first 
possessor when the outcomes of the Creator’s actions were judged not to be true creation.  
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Figure 3. Experiment 3B. Mean ownership rating scores calculated by multiplying character 
selection by confidence rating, minus 0.5. Scores range from -4.5 (full support for first 
possessor) to +4.5 (full support for Creator). Error bars represent one standard error of their 
respective means. Participants are divided based on type of story (e.g., about a painting or a bowl 
being created) and whether they viewed the event as true creation or only modification. 
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General Discussion 
 In the present studies, participants granted ownership to agents who succeeded in creating 
objects. But when creation failed,	  participants were equally as likely to assign ownership of the 
objects to another character who took first possession of them (Experiments 1A and 1B). These 
results suggest that creation establishes ownership, but that ownership is not guaranteed to an 
agent whose attempt to create is unsuccessful.  
 Ownership judgments reflected sensitivity not only to the outcome of an agent’s actions, 
but also to the intent underlying the actions3. More participants granted ownership to the Creator 
when he acted intentionally than when his actions were unintentional (Experiments 2A and 2B). 
Intent also influenced how participants interpreted the outcome of a Creator’s actions: When the 
Creator acted intentionally, participants were more likely to label his actions as true creation. 
When acting without intent, some participants labelled the Creator’s actions as true creation 
whereas others labelled them as mere modification (Experiment 3A). Put differently, in terms 
borrowed from work on action identification, participants varied in the levels on which they 
viewed the Creator’s actions (see Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The level of action identified 
influenced ownership judgments, such that participants who identified higher levels of action 
(i.e., viewed the Creator’s actions as true creation and not just modification) were more likely to 
grant him ownership (Experiment 3B).  
These findings contrast with the few previous studies examining ownership and creation. 
In previous studies, adults did not judge that creation transfers ownership from the original 
owner to the Creator.  For example, participants sided with the original owner of a block of wood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  as	  opposed	  to	  viewing	  the	  Creator’s	  ownership	  stemming	  from	  intent	  and	  labor	  
alone,	  perhaps	  generating	  the	  idea	  to	  create	  influenced	  ownership	  judgments.	  In	  this	  sense,	  participants	  may	  have	  
granted	  ownership	  of	  the	  idea	  to	  the	  Creator,	  and	  ownership	  of	  the	  end	  product	  followed	  (for	  example,	  see	  Shaw,	  
Li,	  &	  Olson,	  2012,	  for	  ownership	  of	  intellectual	  property).	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even after someone else carved it into a valuable statue (Hook, 1993). But in that study, 
judgments were complicated by the fact that the Creator only borrowed the block of wood; there 
was no implication that the original owner no longer wanted to keep it. Thus, while revealing 
that creation is insufficient to transfer ownership, Hook’s study was unable to determine whether 
creation confers ownership for previously non-owned things.  
In another previous study, participants exchanged clay animals with an experimenter, and 
either slightly modified, held, or remodelled the animals into a new shape (Kanngiesser et al., 
2010). Although children endorsed a transfer of ownership following the remodelling task, most 
adults did not. Once again, this differs from the current study in that it deals with the transfer of 
ownership for previously owned things. Furthermore, it is difficult to know whether children 
believed ownership was established through remodelling of the clay, or from inferring the 
experimenter forfeited ownership in giving them permission to completely alter it.  
In the one prior study where participants considered a scenario in which labor was 
performed on non-owned materials, participants did not judge the Creator as the owner (Beggan 
& Brown, 1994).  In this instance, the Creator was likely viewed as having forfeited his right of 
ownership by abandoning his creation for an extended period of time, without explicitly 
indicating his desire to own it. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the Creator initially had the 
right of ownership and then forfeited it, or whether ownership was never conferred by his 
actions. The current study allowed us to demonstrate that ownership is conferred by creation 
when the Creator clearly wishes to possess that which he has labored on. Importantly, this study 
also demonstrates that it is creation per se that establishes ownership, rather than simply owning 
the materials ahead of time. Labor, not first possession, bestows ownership in such 
circumstances. 
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Creation versus possession 
 Ownership judgments in the current studies resemble those found in previous studies in 
which agents acquired ownership by laboring to make an inaccessible object available (e.g., by 
knocking fruit from a tree, dislodging a gem from a cliff, or removing a feather from a cactus; 
Friedman, 2010; Palamar et al., 2012). In the previous studies, ownership was granted to agents 
that were necessary for possession—without the agent’s actions, the object would not be readily 
available. In the current study, Creators can also be viewed as necessary for possession because 
their labor was necessary for bringing an object into existence  (e.g., by turning a metal can into 
an ashtray, a torgo shell into a bowl, or a wooden board into a painting). Thus, the concept of 
“necessary for possession” also extends to objects that previously did not exist. The influence of 
intent on ownership judgments is also similar in cases of possession and creation: Participants 
are far more likely to grant ownership to an agent whose actions are performed intentionally. The 
similarities between previous findings on possession and the current findings on creation suggest 
that a general notion of labor could underlie people’s ownership judgments.   
Alternatively, laboring to create new objects and laboring to make existing objects 
available might not be regarded in the same way. Intent influences ownership judgments in both 
domains, but it is influential in many other domains as well, including parent-child 
communication (Fernald, 1989; Grosse, Scott-Phillips, & Tomasello, 2013; Heyman, 
Sritanyaratana, & Vanderbilt, 2013); humour (Monetta, Grindrod, & Pell, 2009; Perez, 2013; 
Perks, 2012); consumer behaviour (Sirohi, McLaughlin, & Wittink, 1998); job satisfaction 
(Hellman, 1997; Lambert, Hogana, & Bartona, 2001); aggression (De Castro, Veerman, Koops, 
Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002); legal rulings (Bachman, 2011; Kobick & Knobe, 2009); and 
moral responsibility (Young & Saxe, 2011). Thus it is premature to conclude that possession and 
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creation share the same representation based solely on the overlap of a factor that is influential in 
numerous other domains as well. 
Further research should be conducted to identify other factors that might be shared by, or 
distinguish between, these two forms of labor. For example, previous research on possession 
found that the difficulty of acquiring something dictates who is judged to own it. If an object is 
very difficult to acquire, then the first one to do so is judged to own it. However, ownership 
judgments favor both characters equally when the object is easy to acquire (Friedman, 2010; 
Palamar et al., 2012). Future studies could investigate whether the difficulty of creating 
something impacts ownership judgments in the same way. 
Another aspect of creation that remains to be explored is causal control.  In previous 
research on possession, ownership judgments favored an agent whose actions were not only 
intentional, but also accomplished a goal in the manner planned (Palamar et al., 2012). For 
example, one story involved a character trying to free a feather stuck in a cactus. When the 
character knocked the feather out of the cactus on purpose, he was judged to own it in a dispute 
between the agent and another character that picked up the feather first. However, when the 
feather was freed by accident, ownership judgments were split. This notion of lack of control, or 
“causal deviance” (Searle, 1983), influences not only ownership judgments, but also whether an 
agent’s actions will be praised or blamed in cases of moral responsibility (Palamar et al., 2012; 
Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003). But perhaps causal deviance is less influential in cases 
involving creation. After all, creation differs from possession in that it results in introducing an 
object that had not previously existed. It could be that whether causally deviant or not, any action 
taken by an agent that leads to creation may be sufficient to establish ownership, so long as the 
agent intends to create in the first place. 
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  In summary, the present research has shown that creation confers ownership for objects 
made out of non-owned materials. This research highlights the similarities in ownership 
judgments for cases involving created objects and cases involving existing objects that are made 
accessible. Furthermore, the current research increases the credibility of the labor account of 
ownership, broadens our concept of labor itself, and inspires research to further investigate the 
nature of creation and ownership. Understanding what considerations underlie people’s 
ownership judgments helps us to explore how ownership is conceptualized. These same 
considerations influence how we think and behave with regards to the multitude of people and 
objects that we encounter in our everyday lives. 
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Appendix- Comprehension Questions 
 
Response options italicized. 
 
Experiment 1A 
1. Who saw the can first? Mike/Dave 
 
2. In the story, did Mike ever pick up the can? Yes/No 
 
3. What was thrown at the can? A rock/an ashtray/a shovel 
 
4. Was Mike able to crush the can? Yes/No 
 
Experiment 1B 
1. Who saw the can first? Mike/Dave 
 
2. In the story, did Mike ever pick up the can? Yes/No 
 
3. What was thrown at the can? A rock/an ashtray/a shovel 
 
4. What happened to the can? It was crushed/it was dented 
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Experiment 2A 
1. Who threw the can of paint? Mike/Dave/nobody 
2. Who was standing on top of the hill? Mike/Dave/nobody 
3. Did paint spill on the board? Yes/No/I don’t know 
 
Experiment 2B 
1. Who was standing on top of the hill? Mike/Dave/nobody 
2. What caused the board to roll down the hill? A gust of wind/Mike pushed it/a landslide 
3. Why did Mike throw paint at the board? Just for the fun of it/to paint the board** 
**Failed responses ignored due to the ambiguity of the question (approximately half of the 
participants responded “incorrectly” in each condition). 
 
Experiment 3A 
1. What did the torgo shell become? A bowl/an ashtray/a hat 
2. Who picked up the bowl? Mike/Dave 
3. Where did the story take place? A forest/a junkyard/a parking lot 
4. What punched a hole in the torgo shell? A rock/a tree branch 
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Experiment 3B 
Torgo shell story 
1. What did the torgo shell become? A bowl/an ashtray/a hat 
2. Who picked it up? Mike/Dave 
3. Where did the story take place? A forest/a junkyard/a parking lot 
4. What punched a hole in the torgo shell? A rock/a tree branch 
Wooden board story 
1. What did the wooden board become? A painting/a bowl/ a surf board 
2. Who picked it up? Mike/Dave 
3. Where did the story take place? A landfill/a forest/a parking lot 
4. What caused the board to roll down the hill? A gust of wind/a large rock 
 
